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UDP User Data Protocol
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the rapid growth of the Internet over the last two decades, the number
of attacks on the Internet services has increased rapidly. One such example
involves disrupting the service provided by a network or server, either by
crashing the systems, sending some packets that exploit a software vulnera-
bility or by sending a large amount of useless traffic to collapse the resources
of the service. This kind of attack is known as a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack, or a Distributed Denial of Service attack if it is launched by multiple
hosts.
The design principles of the Internet facilitate these kind of attacks [25]:
Resource sharing : in IP networks, due to the packet-switched service,
users share all the resources, and one user’s service can be disturbed by other
user’s behaviour, so bandwidth attacks can disrupt services for legitimate
users.
Simple Core and Complex Edge: One of the principles of the Internet is
that the core network should be simple and all complexity is pushed into the
end hosts. That means that the core of the network is not able to integrate
complex applications, such as those concerning authentication or security.
Due to this simplicity, when an attacker sends packets to the network and
the target receives them, it is almost impossible to verify the true origin of
the packets.
Fast Core Networks and Slow Edge Networks : The core network needs
to have a high capacity due to the heavy traffic that it has to route from
many sources to many destinations. In contrast, an edge network needs less
capacity because it only needs to support its end users. The consequence is
that traffic from the high-capacity core can crush the slow-capacity edge.
A large number of different DoS and DDoS attacks have arisen to take
advantage of these design principles and their vulnerabilities and, as a result,
8
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a widely variety of defense mechanisms have risen in order to defeat these
attacks.
In the current network architecture, network devices (particularly routers)
are bundled with a specialized control plane and various features. This ver-
tical integration essentially binds whatever software and features that are
shipped with those particular devices. Software Defined Networking (SDN)
effectively breaks these pieces apart.
SDN is a type of network architecture that separates the network data
plane (network devices that forward traffic) from the control plane (software
logic that ultimately controls how traffic is flowing through the network).
OpenFlow [22] is a standard interface defined between the control and for-
warding layers of an SDN structure.
One of the reasons to separate the control plane and the data plane is
that the control software of the network can evolve independently from the
hardware.
A second reason is that the separation allows the network to be controlled
from a single high-level software program. There are a large number of
OpenFlow controllers, depending on the programming language, difficulty,
goal, etc. In this project, we will develop a controller with POX.
The goal of this thesis is to analyse how SDN might help us in improving
the current DDoS defense mechanisms. Throughout this project, we will
review the main DDoS defense and attack mechanisms and we will go through
existing algorithms. We will also explain how we can improve them with
OpenFlow. We will test these algorithms in virtual scenarios with Mininet.
This thesis is structured as follows: In the next chapter (see 2) we will
explain the background of this survey. We will talk about the current situ-
ation of DDoS attacks and defenses and how OpenFlow works as well as its
structure. Chapter 3 shows the current situation of firewalls and how they
can help defeating DoS and DDoS. In this chapter there is also a comparison
between firewalls and SDN, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages
of both. Chapter 4 explains the TCP SYN Flooding Protocol Attack as well
as its methods of attacks and defense mechanisms currently in the market.
The algorithm developed to defeat TCP SYN Flooding attacks and the sce-
nario where it is tested will be shown in Chapter see 5. Chapter 6 shows
how defense mechanisms react against a TCP SYN Flooding attack and all
possible information about its behaviour. Finally, the conclusions are shown
in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 DoS attack and defense mechanisms
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is characterised by an explicit attempt by
attackers to prevent the legitimate users of a service from using the service [5]
provided by a network or server. It can be launched in several ways, but this
project is focussed in two of them [25]. The first aims at crashing the system
by sending crafted packets that exploit a software vulnerability in the target
system. The other way is by sending massive volumes of useless traffic to
overwhelm and occupy the resources that could service legitimate traffic.
2.1.1 DoS and DDoS Attacks
The volume of traffic for the attack must be large enough to consume the
target’s resources. In order to deny services and accomplish more complicated
attack detection, the attack is carried out through multiple sources. This
variant of DoS attack is known as DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service)
attack.
A typical DDoS attack contains three main elements as shown in Figure
2.1. First of all, the attacker selects a set of vulnerable systems (zombies)
and sets up attack systems in them. Once the attack mechanisms are in-
stalled, the attacker can launch attack commands to the zombies through a
secure channel to carry out the DoS attack on the victim. The complexity
of the attack increases due to the zombies modifying the packets, commonly
spoofing the source. As a consequence, it becomes even more difficult to
trace the origin of the attack.
Zombie systems, also known as bots and the structure of elements the
attacker can launch to attack systems over them, and carry out joint attacks,
10
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Figure 2.1: DDoS Attack Structure
is commonly known as botnet. An important feature of botnets is the ability
to update software from the attacker through the security channel between
the attacker and the bots.
2.1.2 Attack Taxonomy
In order to devise a taxonomy of DDoS attacks, we have to take into ac-
count some features of the attacks, as well as the means used to prepare and
perform the attack, the characteristics of the attack itself and the selection
and the effects upon the victim. In this survey, we will focus on selected
attacks depending on the victim type, classifying them as Protocol Attacks
(see 2.1.2.1), Bandwidth Attacks (see 2.1.2.2) or Logic Attacks (see 2.1.2.3).
There are already some other taxonomies to explain all aspects in greater
detail [11, 18, 33]
2.1.2.1 Protocol Attacks
The attacker continuously sends packets to the server at a particular rate to
take advantage of the inherent design of common network protocols. In other
words, these attacks try to exploit the weaknesses of the system, considering
the expected behaviour of protocols such as TCP, UDP, and ICMP.
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SYN Flooding Attacks flood the server, by sending SYN packets that
consume its resources and fill up the backlog (This survey is focused on this
type of attack, which is further explained in Chapter 4). A UDP Flood
Attack is another protocol attack which aims at bringing down the server by
sending UDP packets to a random port in the target. For a large number
of UDP packets, the target will be forced to send back ICMP packets, but
to a unreachable destination [9]. Other examples are Smurf Attacks [1] and
ICMP Attacks.
2.1.2.2 Bandwidth Attacks
High-data-volume attacks can consume all available bandwidth between an
ISP and a target. The ISP networks need to have a high capacity due to
the heavy traffic that they have to route from many resources to many des-
tinations. The connections between the ISP and the victim usually have less
capacity than the ones inside the ISP, so when high volumes of traffic coming
from the ISP go through these connections, the links fill up and legitimate
traffic slows down. An attacker can consume bandwidth by transmitting
any traffic to all the network connection [14]. For example, high volumes of
simple ICMP packets to consume the bandwidth [3].
2.1.2.3 Logic Attacks
In Logic or software attacks, a small number of malformed packets exploit
known specific software bugs in the operating system or in an application of
the target system. This can potentially disable the victim’s machine with
one or multiples packets. These attacks are relatively easy to avoid either
through the installation of software that eliminates vulnerabilities [35] or by
adding specialized filter rules to filter out malformed packets [19].
In ping of death attack, the attacker sends a ping message with the packet
size over the limit (656536 octets) so that it is allowed to be retransmitted
over the Internet. Other examples are land attacks, Teardrop Attack [9].
2.1.3 Defense Classification
DDoS defense mechanisms have become one of the most important challenges
in network security. Therefore, a large number of defense classifications and
taxonomies have emerged [18, 33]. In this thesis, we will present four broad
categories. The purpose of this categorization has been to highlight the main
features of each category of defense.
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Attack Prevention: it aims at stopping the attacks before they can reach
their target (see 2.1.3.1); Attack Detection: it aims at detecting the attack
when it occurs (see 2.1.3.2); Attack Source Identification: it aims at locating
the source of the attack (see 2.1.3.3); and Attack Reaction: aims at eliminat-
ing or reducing the effects of the attack (see 2.1.3.4).
2.1.3.1 Attack Prevention
Its objective is to stop attacks before they actually cause damage. This type
of category tries to deny traffic that can be recognized as malicious, based on
known patterns. The best place to allocate these mechanisms is in the edge
routers and hosts, which implies fixing all the vulnerabilities of all Internet
hosts that can be misused for an attack. Some useful approaches to prevent
DDoS attack against a target machine are:
Filtering This measure implies installing ingress and egress packet filters on
all the routers. In order to protect the target from attacks arriving to
the network and prevent the network itself from being a potential at-
tacker, filtering all the packets entering and leaving the network might
be a good option.
Firewall Before an attack is carried out, a firewall might be useful to filter
out traffic according to the protocol, ports or incoming IP addresses.
But, the problem is that firewalls cannot distinguish between an at-
tack and legitimate traffic, and denying all traffic for a specific port
or protocol is not suitable. Only in those attacks in which the signa-
ture patterns are known, may these patterns be avoided. However, a
insignificant variation or new attacks can make the attack go unde-
tected.
Protocol Security addresses the problem of protocol design weaknesses in
order to prevent Protocol Attacks (see 2.1.2.1) such as a TCP SYN
Attack, malformed packets, UDP Flooding, etc. [6]
2.1.3.2 Attack Detection
Once the attack is in process, an attack detection mechanism must recognize
if it is actually an attack or just legitimate traffic. Also, in an attack situation,
legitimate traffic must flow without being misclassified and disrupted. When
some traffic is confused with attack traffic while it is not, it is called false
positive. False positives are those considered as legitimate traffic but that
they are actually attacks. [4]
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An effective attack detection mechanism must keep the balance between
false positives and false negatives. There are basically two kinds of detection
schemes [13, 35] :
Pattern Detection An attack can constantly be detected by comparing
incoming traffic with known attacks signatures stored in a database.
These patterns are constructed by network security experts based on
previous attacks. If the attack matches the database, this mechanism
becomes very efficient with almost no false positives. Problems arise
when there are new attacks or slight variants that can dodge the de-
fense. SNORT [28] and Bro [23] are two commonly used pattern detec-
tion approaches.
Anomaly Based Detection It identifies malicious activity in a network by
detecting anomalous network traffic patterns. Some network analysis
behaviour such as detecting the attacks based on the size of the packet,
since those being too short violate specific application layers protocols.
Rate-based detection is also an important network analysis. It perceives
changes in the traffic flow, detecting floods by using a time-based model
of normal traffic volumes.
The parameters on which the defense mechanism is based to detect the
anomaly can be [13]: Standard, they relay on protocol standards-for
example, an attack detection can detect half-open TCP connections-
and Trained, which generates allowed threshold values normal condi-
tions based on the system’s behaviour under normal conditions.
2.1.3.3 Attack Source Identification
Once an attack is detected, the best response is to block the attack traffic at
its source. It aims at locating the attack sources regardless of whether the
source address field in each packet contains correct or erroneous information.
Once the attack detection phase is over, the IP attack traffic should be traced
back to its source. This is taken care of in phase [25].
Unfortunately, it is not easy to track IP traffic down to its source. This
is due to two aspects of the IP protocol. The first is the ease with which
IP source addresses can be forged. The second is the stateless nature of IP
routing, where routers normally know only the next step for forwarding a
packet, instead of the complete end-to-end route taken by each packet.
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2.1.3.4 Attack Reaction
Attack reaction tries to eliminate the effects of an attack and filter the attack
traffic without disturbing legitimate traffic. The reaction to the attack must
minimize the damage caused by the attack by developing a reaction scheme
while the attack is in progress.
Filtering Dropping the traffic considered as unwanted or malicious is an
effective way to prevent a DDoS attack. The problem is that some at-
tacks use well-formed packets and legitimate requests to servers, mak-
ing them non-filterable. There is also the risk of accidentally deny-
ing service to legitimate traffic. However, it is an efficient mechanism
against spoofed IP packets.
Dropping spoofed incoming packets by ingress filtering [8], identifying
and dropping packets based on the change of the time-window-size,
saving proved previously legitimate IPs [24], are some of the attack
reaction mechanisms based on filtering.
Rate Limiting The rate of malicious traffic packets is reduced with this
technique when there is a high number of false positives and traffic has
been identified as malicious by the detection mechanisms.
Max-Min Fair Share sets up maximum and minimum thresholds by
the routers fixed by the servers. Level-K controls the traffic admission
rates of the routers; k hops away the victim using a max-min fairness
approach [37].
2.2 OpenFlow (SDN)
The explosion of mobile devices, server virtualization, security problems and
the advent of cloud services are among the reasons for the networking in-
dustry to begin to question traditional network architecture. OpenFlow is
intended to solve the problem of assigning resources to users in an easy way
by giving them the control plane of the network without disturbing traffic
flows.
In traditional routers and switches, both the control plane (high level
routing decisions) and the data plane (packet forwarding) are embedded in
the same device. An OpenFlow Switch separates these two functions (Fig-
ure 2.2). The data plane function still resides on the switch, while the control
plane is moved to a separate device called the Controller (see 2.2.5) that man-
ages the switch and communicates with each device over the Secure Channel
(see 2.2.1.2), via the OpenFlow Protocol (see 2.2.2).
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Figure 2.2: OpenFlow Switch Components
The switch contains flow tables 2.2.1.1, which are updated by means of
OpenFlow Protocol by adding, updating and deleting OpenFlow Switch flow
entries. When the traffic flow gets to the switch, it checks if the packets
match the flow table (see 2.2.3); if so, the action defined at the flow entry is
executed. Otherwise, the packet is either sent to the Controller or dropped.
Throughout this section, we will explain in detail the main parts of the
OpenFlow Switch, as well as the Controller and how they work together.
The first version of the OpenFlow (1.1) protocol was released on 2011, one
year later, in February 2012, the ONF approved and published version 1.2.
Presently, the current version of the protocol and the one that will be used
in this project is 1.4 [34].
2.2.1 Switch Components
2.2.1.1 Flow Table
A flow table consists of several flow entries (see table 2.2.1.1), and each flow
table entry contains:
• Match Fields: This consists of fields which match against the packets
and tell the switch how a flow should be processed. The match fields
(see table 2.2.1.1) are:
– Ingress Port: It matches against the switch port number at
which the packet arrives. This may be a physical or a switch-
defined virtual port.
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– Ether source: It matches against the Ethernet source address.
– Ether dst: It matches against the Ethernet destination address.
– Ether type: Ethernet type of the OpenFLow packet payload. It
differentiates between both standard Ethernet and 802.3.
– VLAN id: It matches against the VLAN ID.
– VLAN priority: It defines the VLAN ID priority.
– IP src: It matches against the IP source address (IPv4 and IPv6).
It can use subnet mask or arbitrary bitmask.
– IP dst: It matches against the IP destination address (IPv4 and
IPv6). It can use subnet mask or arbitrary bitmask.
– IP proto: It defines TCP, UDP or ICMP protocol packets.
– IP ToS bits: 8 bits value to specify the IP type of service.
– src port: It matches against the source port machine the packet
was sent from.
– dst port: It matches against the destination port machine the
packet is sent to.
• Priority: Integer number to define what priority should be followed
in the flow entries. The lower the number, the higher the priority. The
first flow entries defined have priority over the later ones.
• Counters: Counters are updated when packets are matched. They are
maintained for each flow table, flow entry, port, queue, group, meter
and meter band. A switch is not required to support all counters.
• Instructions: When a packet matches against a flow entry, a function
is executed. In this field, the actions to be executed for those packets
are defined. Some of these actions are: Output, forwarding a packet to a
specified OpenFlow port (ALL, CONTROLLER, TABLE, INPUT and
OUTPUT PORT number, FLOOD); Drop, it drops match packets. . .
• Timeouts: The maximum amount of time or idle time before the
flow is expired by the switch. This field will be better explained in
section 2.2.4.
• Cookies: They may be used by the controller to filter flow statistics,
flow modification and flow deletion. These are not used when process-
ing packets.
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Match Fields Priority Counters Instructions Timeouts Cookie
Table 2.1: Main Components of a flow entry
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Table 2.2: Main components of the Match Field
2.2.1.2 Secure Channel
The message exchange between the Controller and the OpenFlow Switch is
carried out over the Secure Channel. One controller can manage multiple
secure channels into the topology, one per OpenFlow Switch.
The Secure Channel is usually instantiated as a single network connection
between the switch and the controller, using TLS or plain TCP. Alternatively,
the OpenFlow Channel may be composed of multiple network connections to
exploit parallelism. The only requirement is that it should provide TCP/IP
connectivity.
2.2.2 OpenFLow Protocol
OpenFlow Protocol is the protocol used for communication between the Con-
troller and the OpenFlow Switch. It is built over the TCP/IP architecture
and there are three different types of messages:
Controller-to-Switch messages The Controller sends messages to the switch
in order to either perform actions or request information from the
switch. These messages may or may not require a response from the
OpenFlow Switch. The Controller may request the identity and the
basic capabilities of the switches; it is able to send messages to man-
age the state of the switches in order to modify, update and add flow
entries in the OpenFlow Switch flow tables; it can request information
and statistics of the flow entries; it may send the packets directly to an
specific switch port, which will be received via packet-in messages etc.
Asynchronous messages The Controller may receive messages from the
switch with no need for the controller to ask for them. When a packet
arrives at the switch and matches a flow entry with the instructions
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set up by sending the packets to the Controller, the Controller receives
an asynchronous message. The Controller may also receive the switch
status changes.
The three main asynchronous messages types are: Packet-in, it trans-
fers the control of a packet to the Controller. Flow-Removed, when a
flow entry is removed, the switch informs the Controller. Port-status,
it informs the controller of a change on a port.
Symmetric messages Symmetric messages are sent without request in a
concurrent way and in both directions. The OpenFlow protocol uses
symmetric messages when the connection starts (Hello messages); to
verify the viability of a controller-switch connection (Echo and Echo
reply messages); and for error messages on the other side of the con-
nection.
OpenFlow Protocol fields are shown in figure A.3.
2.2.3 Matching
Figure 2.3 shows the functions that OpenFlow Switch performs when it re-
ceives a packet.
First of all, the switch starts by accomplishing a table lookup in the
first flow table. Packet match fields used in the table lookup depend on the
the flow table (see 2.2.1.1) match fields. A packet matches a flow table if the
values in the packets match against the values defined in the fields of the flow
table entry. When a packet matches against a flow entry, the action carried
out is the one with the highest priority as defined in the field Instructions
of the flow entries (Priority field). Then, the counters associated to the flow
entries selected must be updated.
Every flow table must support a table-miss flow entry in order to process
table misses. The table-miss flow entry specifies how to process packets
unmatched by other flow entries in the flow table, and it may send packets
to the controller, drop packets or direct packets to the subsequent table.
2.2.4 Flow Removal
The size of the flow tables is not unlimited, so it is interesting to remove flow
entries once they are not useful anymore. This function can be performed
by either a request sent by the Controller or via the flow expiry mechanism.
The switch flow expiry is run by the switch and it is based on the the flow
entries configuration, specifically the Timeouts field. There are two different
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Figure 2.3: Flowchart of Packet Process
types of timeouts, hard-timeout and idle-timeout. Hard-timeout is the
time (in seconds) a flow entry remains in the flow tables of the switch once
the rule is set up until the timeout is over. Idle-timeout is the time (in
seconds) a flow entry remains in the flow table of the switch since the rule is
set up until the timeout is over, but each time a packet matches against the
flow entry, the counter starts again. If no packets arrive before the timeout
value, the flow entry is removed from the flow table, freeing up memory of
the switch.
2.2.5 Controller
The Controller computes flow-entries based on the program or the protocol
running on it. It also takes care of adding or deleting flow-entries from the
flow table present in the OpenFlow switches. A Controller can either be a
simple PC or a dedicated sophisticated machine for handling complex tasks
and having multiple accounts for different researches to experiment for their
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research projects.
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The natural question arising when using a central controller has to do
with scalability, reliability and performance of using a single controller. These
questions have been answered to some extent in one of the previous proto-
types, in which a low-cost desktop PC could process around ten thousand
flows per second. This is good enough for a large college campus. Even
scalability and reliability could be accounted for by having multiple separate
controllers, each one of them working on a stateless principle.
Figure 2.4 helps to understand the concepts southbound and north-
bound. A southbound interface allows a particular network component
to communicate with a lower-level component, in this case the OpenFlow
Switchs. On the other hand, a northbound interface is an interface that al-
lows a particular component of a network to communicate with a higher-level
component, in this case, the applications.
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In the SDN architecture, which is studied in this project, the southbound
interface might be compared with the OpenFlow Protocol 2.2.2. SDN con-
trollers expose northbound APIs, allowing you to deploy a wide range of
off-the-shelf and custom-built network applications.
Due to the complexity of developing the OpenFlow Controller, a wide
variety of different SDN controllers compatible with OpenFlow Protocol have
emerged to help the developer abstract to low-level programming. Table 2.2.5
shows some of the most popular SDN controllers compatible with OpenFlow
Protocol.
NOX POX Ryu Floodlight
Language C++ Python Python Java
Performance Fast Slow Slow Fast
Learning Curve Moderate Easy Moderate Steep
Table 2.3: Most common SDN Controllers
2.2.5.1 POX
POX controller [20] is a platform for the rapid development and prototyping
of network control software using Python. It is based on NOX [21], a Net-
work Operating System which provides a central and uniform programmatic
interface to the whole of the OpenFlow network.
Like an Operating System which provides the ability to read, edit and
write various media, POX provides the ability to view and control the net-
work. Applications written on top of POX (APIs Northbound) would perform
the actual network management tasks, while POX provides the following two
major functionalities:
• Centralized Programming Model, where the programs would be written
as if the entire network was present on a single machine.
• Programs are written in terms of a high level of abstraction.
Chapter 3
Firewall Security System
A Firewall is a network security system that is used to control the flow of
ingress and egress traffic, usually between a more secure local-area network
(LAN) and a less secure wide-area network (WAN). The system analyses
data packets for parameters like L2/L3 headers (i.e., MAC and IP address)
or performs deep packet inspection (DPI) for higher layer parameters to filter
network traffic.
3.1 Types of Firewall
Basically, there are two different types of firewall, depending in which layer
of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnect) model [36] the firewall is set up.
Firewalls can be divided between Network Layer firewalls (see 3.1.1)
and Application Layer firewalls (see 3.1.2). The important thing to rec-
ognize is that he lower the level of the forwarding mechanism, the less ex-
amination the firewall can perform. Generally speaking, lower-level firewalls
are faster, but are easier to avoid.
3.1.1 Network Layer firewalls
Also called Packet-filtering firewalls, they validate packets based on protocol,
source and destination IP addresses and port numbers as well as other pa-
rameters within the IP layer. This technology is commonly used in switches
and routers and it is generally accomplished by using Access Control Lists
(ACL). Due to the low-level on which network layer firewalls work, they tend
to be very fast and very transparent to users.
In a networking environment, ACLs allow or deny flow traffic through
rules applied to port numbers or IP addresses that are available on a host or
23
CHAPTER 3. FIREWALL SECURITY SYSTEM 24
other layer 3. They can generally be configured to control both inbound and
outbound traffic.
The main problem of ACLs is that they are static, and packet-filtering
firewalls do not have visibility into the data field of the IP packet. Another
problem of network layer firewalls is that some attacks do not seem to be an
attack for these firewalls, due to the attackers using well-known port numbers,
or tunnels traffic unsuspectingly within the traffic allowed by the ACL rules.
These caveats make Network Layer Firewalls a defense mechanism that is
not fully trustworthy, but a complement to others.
3.1.2 Application Layer firewalls
Regarding the OSI model, the application layer is the highest layer it has.
Application Layer firewalls, as their name suggests, work in the application
layer of the OSI model. These devices act on behalf of a client for requested
services, and provide additional information from port scans and application
attacks.
But there are some caveats. The higher the OSI model goes up, the
more software will be needed instead of hardware. This makes Application
Layer firewalls slower than Network Layer firewalls because they have to
run applications, maintain the state for both the client and the server, and
inspect traffic at the same time. Another problem is that the firewall needs
to know how to handle specific applications.
3.2 Firewalls against DoS and DDoS
Figure 3.1 shows the four most common targets of DoS and DDoS attacks
and the percentage of attacks that achieve their goal. This graph is based
on Radware Emergency Response Team (ERT)[27] security report[26] during
2011, 2012 and 2013.
After the internet pipeline and the servers, the third most common target
of DoS and DDoS and also one of the most vulnerable ones (an average of 25%
of attacks achieve their purpose) is the firewall. ACLs can store thousands
of active connections to filter out legitimate and illegitimate traffic. The
problem is that some DDoS attacks (HTTP floods, TCP SYN floods, etc.)
are composed of millions of apparently legitimate items of traffic and the
firewall opens a new connection on its ACLs for each malicious packet. This
results in the quick exhaustion of the connection tables, and once they reach
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Figure 3.1: Network components being attacked
the maximum capacity, the firewall will drop all the new connections (from
legitimate and illegitimate clients).
This happens due to the fact that firewalls are not designed to be a defense
mechanism against DoS or DDoS. Firewalls match every packet one by one
against the ACLs and since firewalls cannot distinguish between malicious
and legitimate users, when an attack is carried out, it results in bottlenecks.
Although firewalls cannot distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
clients, there are some defense mechanisms based on firewall technologies
and firewall complements against DoS attacks. In Section 4.1.2 we will go
through some defense mechanisms against SYN flooding attacks, categorized
according to whether defense mechanism is an end-host (see 4.1.2.1) or a
network-based (see 4.1.2.2) mechanism.
3.3 SDN vs Firewalls
Previous section shows why firewalls are not the best solution against DoS
and DDoS attacks. As it explains, since firewalls are focussed on filtering
traffic based on flows rather than in packets, it becomes more difficult to
discern discern between legitimate and illegitimate traffic. OpenFlow features
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can play important roles to complement firewall technologies, listed here
below:
• Section 2.2 explains the basic feature of SDN technology, the separation
of the control plane and the data plane. This division between both lev-
els allows the abstraction of the lowest-level network elements and tech-
nologies. As a result, it enables software developers with little knowl-
edge in network programming development and design software using
high-level languages to administrate network infrastructures. More-
over, vendors of classic routers and network components, integrate the
control plane software in them, thus denying the possibility of changes.
Network-based firewalls are integrated into normal routers and designed
by vendors. This restricts their total customization according to cus-
tomer desires.
As explained in 2.1.2 DoS and DDoS may be carried out in differ-
ent ways, depending on the purpose of the attack. Protocol Attacks
(see 2.1.2.1), Bandwidth attacks (see 2.1.2.2) and Protocol Attacks (see 2.1.2.3)
have their own properties and they are designed differently. Therefore,
the same criteria should be applied to defense mechanisms. SDN allows
for the design of specific defense mechanisms depending on the goals
and vulnerabilities of the defending target.
• Both Network-based firewalls and SDN technology are based on net-
work policies, which define the funcions to be carried out for the flow
by means of table entries and with information to match against the
traffic. Firewalls use ACLs and OpenFlow Switches use Flow Tables
(see 2.2.1.1). The fields of the ACLs entries[2] are more limited than
the OpenFlow Flow Tables ones. A typical table entry in firewall is
SRC IP, DST IP, PORT and ACTION. On the other case, OpenFlow
Flow Tables have more fields for different protocols and layers in the
OSI model (MAC address, IP address, VPN, MPLS).
It follows that with OpenFlow Flow Tables it is possible to define more
concrete policies than with ACLs, enabling the defense of DoS and
DDoS attacks targets by defining more specific characteristics in them
(for example, by controlling the traffic sent to the 80 port of a web-
server).
• SDN technology makes it possible orchestrate a set of OpenFlow Switches
through one unique Controller, thus allowing for the centralization of
the network’s control plane. Unlike Network-based firewalls, which are
set up for each switch or router in the network topology, OpenFlow
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Protocol provides the advantage of administering all the traffic and the
flow policies through only one server, thus allowing the scalability and
reliability over the network infrastructure.
Thanks to this orchestration, it is easier to know about DoS and DDoS
since the Controller can trace all the traffic throughout the OpenFlow
Switches and follow it as a whole.
Chapter 4
Theoretical Analysis
4.1 Protocol Attacks: TCP SYN Flooding
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is one of the most common protocols
within the transport layer, and one of the central components of the Internet
Protocol suite (IP). TCP provides reliable, ordered, error checked streams
of packets between two hosts. In addition to these characteristics, TCP
is a connection-oriented protocol, that is, a prior connection between both
parties is necessary before starting the exchange of information. This process
is known as TCP three-way handshake (Figure 4.1(a)).
X is a client that wants to carry out a friendly TCP connection with the
server Y. First of all, X makes a request by sending a synchronize (SYN)
message to Y. The sequence number field of the TCP header gets a value, x.
The server receives the request and responses by sending an acknowledgment
(SYN-ACK) back to the client, in which the acknowledgement number is the
sequence number of the synchronize message increased by one (x+1 ); and the
sequence number is a new value y. Once the client receives the SYN-ACK it
checks if the acknowledgement number received matches with the sequence
number sent with the SYN message incremented by one. When the client
carries out the necessary verifications it sends back an ACK message, with
the sequence number field sets as SYN-ACKs acknowledgement number and
the ACK message acknowledgement number field is set to y+1.
While the server waits for the SYN-ACK’s response, it keeps the connec-
tion in a half open state and maintains a backlog queue for the information
about the connections. Once the server receives the ACK, it changes the
state to established and frees up memory of the queue. Because the size of
the backlog queue is finite, the half-open connection will remain on it until
a time-out is exceeded. In the case that the queue is full, all new incoming
28
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Figure 4.1: TCP Three-way handshake and SYN Flooding
connection requests will be dropped.
Once the TCP three-way handshake process is finished the connection
between client and server is established, and they already can share infor-
mation between them. To close the connection between both parties, there
are two ways: once the the client has finished it requesting to the server, it
sends a FIN message and the server will answers with a FIN ACK message;
the other way is when some error occur, then either the server or the client
send a RST message to conclude the connection.
TCP SYN Flooding attack, as the name suggests, aims to exhaust the
server’s backlog queue flooding it with SYN messages, but once the attacker
receive the corresponding SYN-ACK from the server, they will not response
with the acknowledge message, forcing the server to keep the connection in-
formation in the backlog queue until the time-out is exceeded (Figure 4.1(b)).
As a result, when a friendly client wants to set up a TCP connection with
the server, it will be denied. The biggest challenge for the attacker is ensure
that the source IP address which is used to establish the connection is not
reachable by the server. Otherwise, the source will send a RST packet to the
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server that cause server to reset the connection and free up the memory of
the queue. The attackers try to achieve this goal through different methods
of attacks, explained in the section below (see 4.1.1).
4.1.1 Methods of Attack
Can be categorized according to how the attacker carries out the attack over
the victim: Direct Attack, Spoofed-based Attack and Distributed Attack [12].
4.1.1.1 Direct Attack (Figure 4.2)
Attacker
Victim
SYNs SYN-ACKs
Figure 4.2: Direct Attack
In this case, the attacker is the one that accomplishes the attack against the
victim directly. It does not even spoof the source IP address. Instead, it will
just ensures that there will not be response after it receives the SYN-ACK
message.
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4.1.1.2 Spoofed-based Attack (Figure 4.3)
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Figure 4.3: Spoofed-based Attack
This version of SYN flooding attacks the victim directly, but it spoofs the
source IP address in the SYN packet. As has been explained before, a
primary consideration is address selection. An attacker can choose spoofed
IP address either using a single source which is known will not respond to
the SYN-ACK, or using a list of source address under the assumption that
some percentage of them will not respond.
4.1.1.3 Distributed Attack (Figure 4.4)
SYN-ACKs SYN-ACKs
Commands Commands
SYNs SYNs
Zombie Zombie
Victim
Attacker
Figure 4.4: Distributed Attack
In this case, the attacker carries out the attack through numerous zombie
machines on the internet. This attack is much more difficult to counter, due
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to the attacker not being the one that accomplish. Zombie machines are
constantly added and removed from the botnet.
4.1.2 Prevention and Response
The TCP SYN Flooding vulnerability has been well-known for over a
decade. This section discusses several solutions aimed at making these at-
tacks ineffective. Some of these are already on the market, but no solution
has been standardized yet.
These solutions are divided in two classes depending on where the defense
mechanisms are being implemented. The first class involves modification and
improvement of the end-host TCP implementation, it is called End-host
Countermeasures (see 4.1.2.1). The second class involves implementation
in the network itself, Network-based Countermeasures (see 4.1.2.2).
4.1.2.1 End-host Countermeasures
Increasing TCP Backlog The basic TCP SYN Flooding attack aims at
overflowing the host’s backlog of connecting sockets in order to deny
future connections. A basic countermeasure is to increase the size
of the TCP backlog for incoming connections. Increasing the
size of the backlog is typically possible by altering the listen() method
and setting operating system kernel parameters.
This method should not be considered as a good defense mechanism
against SYN flooding attacks, because an attacker may scale to a larger
number of orders than the host my support, even if the size of the
backlog has been increased.
Reducing the SYN-RECEIVED Timer When the server receives the
SYN message from a host, it keeps this connection in a half-open con-
nection state until either the ACK is received or a timeout is exceeded;
then the backlog memory is freed up. A simple mechanism is to in-
crease the number of resources devoted to half-open connec-
tions and to put a tighter limit on the timeouts.
As in the method above, the flaw in this one is also when aggressive
attacks occur, because the attacker can avoid the defense mechanism
simply by increasing the rate of the arriving packets and, as a result,
exhaust the backlog.
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SYN Caches This method functions by reducing the amount of state ini-
tially allocated to backlog generated by a received SYN message, while
putting off instantiating of the full state [15]. A hash table with
a limited amount of space in each entry is used to store the
connection information state instead of using the backlog. The
hash table keeps the information until all the connection process is
finished and the server has received the handshake-completing ACK.
Then, this data can be moved into a full backlog.
The code must be prepared to handle state overflows and choose which
items to drop in order to preserve fairness. By taking care of these
possible problems, the SYN cache data structure will be robust against
attackers attempting to overflow its buckets, because it uses the initia-
tor’s local port number and some secret bits in the hash value.
SYN Cookies As with SYN Caches, SYN cookies also work by reducing
the amount of state initially allocated to the backlog. But unlike cache
approach, this technique causes zero state to be generated by a re-
ceived SYN message. Instead of keeping the information in the server
machine, this method compresses the connection state into the
bits of the Sequence Number TCP header field used in the
SYN-ACK message. When the server receives the ACK message
with the sequence number increased by one, the data for the backlog
can be generated and a full backlog can be instantiated by decompress-
ing the Acknowledgement field. The decompression can be effective
even under an SYN flooding attack because there is no storage load on
the listener [7].
Not all the backlog data can fit into the 32-bits sequence number TCP
header field, so some TCP options required for high performance might
be disabled.
Some defense mechanisms might combine two or more of these defense
mechanisms. For example, an option which is already included in some
operating systems is the use of combined SYN Cookies and enlarged backlog.
In a normal situation, SYN Cookie mechanisms are not enabled, but they
are usually turned on when the backlog is running out of space.
4.1.2.2 Network-based Countermeasures
Filtering It works by using ingress and egress filtering configuring exter-
nal and internal interfaces on routers to block packets that
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have source addresses from the internal network or outside
the internal network. This mechanisms is highly effective to pre-
vent attacks that rely on spoofed packets.
However, it is not effective against attacks that using a botnet, in which
each bot carries out the attack through a Direct Attack (see 4.1.1.1).
Firewall and Proxies These devices can buffer end hosts from SYN flood-
ing attacks by means of two different methods, either using the Fire-
wall as a Relay or using the Firewall as a Semi-transparent
Gateway [29].
In the Firewall as a Relay method (figure 4.5), when the firewall
receives the ACK message from client X before the packet reaches
server Y, it responds to X with a spoofed SYN-ACK message. In a
fairness connection (figure 4.5(a)), client X will respond with an
ACK message and once the firewall receives it, it will send to server
Y a spoofed SYN message and while forwarding a ACK message for
establishing the legitimate connection.
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Figure 4.5: Firewall as a Relay
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If the server is under attack (figure 4.5(b)), since the server does not
receive any SYN message until the firewall does not receive the ACK
message, no half-open connection are kept in the backlog of server Y.
Figure 4.6 shows another case, where the Firewall acts as a Semi-
transparent Gateway. In this case, once the firewall has received
SYN message, it is forwarded to the server Y. This server sends the
SYN-ACK sends back to X message and, as the firewall receives it, two
functions are carried out: the firewall forwards the SYN-ACK message
to X and it also spoofs an ACK message and sends it to Y. In a secure
connection (figure 4.6(a)), client X will respond with the ACK.
If X is making an attack (figure 4.6(b)), it will not respond with
the SYN-ACK, and after a timeout, the firewall will respond with an
spoofed RST message. This method intends not to keep half-open con-
nections in the backlog, but to rather keep the state as an established
connection.
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Figure 4.6: Firewall as a Semi-transparent Gateway
Active Monitor This category of solutions consists of using a software
agent to continuously monitor TCP/IP traffic in a network at a given
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place. An agent can collect communication control information to gen-
erate a view of all connections that can be observed on a monitored
network.
Chapter 5
Experimental Implementation
This chapter presents a DoS defense mechanism against Protocol Attacks,
specifically SYN Flooding Attacks.
As mentioned int the Introduction (Chapter 1) the scope of this project is
to study how SDN technology can help to defeat DoS and DDoS. It will also
be compare SDN with firewall technologies, and analyse how they behave
under DoS and DDoS attacks.
This study presents a Network-based defense mechanism developed with
the POX Controller. In order to test this mechanism, a virtual scenario is
simulated, using the following technologies:
• It is necessary to work over on virtual network where tests may be
carried out. To do so, Mininet is used (see 5.2.1) to simulate a network
topology, as explained in subsection 5.3.1.
• Through a POX Controller an algorithm is developed, as shown in
subsection 5.1;this algorithm works as the defense mechanism against
TCP SYN Flooding.
• In order to get information about the traffic flow in the network and to
obtain statistics on the amount of packets flowing to each host, sFlow
(see subsection 5.2.2) is used to monitor and control the traffic on the
network.
• Some virtual host of the network topology will work as attackers. Their
behaviour is explained in subsection 5.3.2
Next chapter (see 6) shows the results obtained once the tests have been
carried out.
37
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5.1 Algorithm proposed against TCP SYN
Flooding Attacks
Algorithm 1 shows the defense mechanism behaviour this thesis is focussed
on. It is based on the idea that if a client has ever carried out a correct
connection with the server, future connections from this same client will also
be legitimate ones. As it is explained in subsection 2.1.3, there are four
different types of defense mechanisms, depending on the phase the attack is
on. The defense mechanism shown by the algorithm uses two different types
of defense mechanisms: Attack Detection (see 2.1.3.2) and Attack Reaction
(see 2.1.3.4).
For the attack detection phase, the defense uses anomaly detection to
warn whenever an attack is taking place. The anomaly detection system of
this defense mechanism tries to identify the attack based on two possible
anomalies. The first one is checking out the TCP header flags; when an
attacker tries to perform a SYN Flooding Attack by spoofing the packets, it
is common to modify the packet fields, both in the IP (see A.1) and TCP
headers (see A.2). Sometimes TCP flags are modified to confuse the target
[10, 16]. In this case, the algorithm will only take into account the packets
with a correct form of SYN, SYN ACK and ACK messages, skipping the
ones with fake fields. The second possible anomaly depends on the amount
of traffic arriving at the server. If the number of packets for the server is
over the threshold, then the defense mechanism is informed about it and
appropriate measures are taken.
Once the server is under attack, the attack reaction phase starts, by deny-
ing malicious traffic from untrusted sources. Only the ones operating in a
correct way will be able to communicate with the server.
As subsection 2.2.3 explains, when the packets get to the switch and do
not match the flow entries, they are sent to the Controller. In this case,
the packet in variable defined in the algorithm represents those packets. The
Controller uses different data structures and variables to control the network.
In order to control the no attacker hosts, three different data structures are
used: SYN Received, SYNAKC Received and Friendly Hosts. Through the
variable Flag Attack the Controller is able to know if the system is either
under attack or in a normal state. The following lines explain the different
behaviours of the mechanisms in both cases.
A The target of the algorithm in a non-attack state is to keep the in-
formation of the legitimate hosts in order to recognize them in future
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input : packet in arrived from the OpenFlow Switched
output: action to carry out
Data: Dictionaries: SY N Received, SY NACK Received,
Friendl Hosts, FlagAttack
1 if no Flag Attack and packet in protocol is TCP then
2 if packet in is SYN message then
3 Add to SY N Received dictionary, with index = IP source
and value = seq and ack
4 ;
5 else if packet in is SYN ACK message then
6 if packet in destination IP is in SYN Received and
ack + 1 = seq SYNACK Received then
7 Add to SY NACK Received dictionary, with index = IP
destination and value = seq and ack
8 ;
9 ;
10 else if packet in is ACK message then
11 if packet in source IP is in SYNACK Received and
ack + 1 = seq SYN Received then
12 Add to Friendly Hosts dictionary, with index = IP
destination and value = port
13 Install flow entry in OpenFlow Switch in both directions
;
14 ;
15 end
16 else if Flag Attack and packet in protocol is TCP then
17 if packet in IP is in Friendly hosts then
18 Forward packet in
19 ;
20 else Drop packet in ;
21 end
22 else
23 Forward packet in
24 end
Algorithm 1: Algorithm against TCP SYN Flooding Attacks
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connections. These hosts will be stored in the Friendly Hosts list, keep-
ing their IP and the OpenFlow Switch through which they arrived. In
order to accomplish this classification, packet in fields are analyzed and
the TCP Handshake process is performed as follows.
Once the algorithm has checked that the Flag Attack variable is false
and that the packet in transport protocol is TCP, it ascertains, through
the TCP Flags field, the type of message. Let’s think on a secure TCP
connection: the first message must be a SYN message, and that is
proved through the line 2 of the algorithm. Then, the source IP and the
values of the acknowledgement and sequential number fields (line 3 ) are
stored in the SYN Received. After that, the packet will be forwarded
to its destination. Once the server receives the SYN message, it will
respond as it is explained in section 4.1. The Controller will receive
the SYN ACK message from the server in line 6. In this part, the main
idea is to move the IP source address, stored the SYN Received message
list, to the SYNACK Received message list. In order to ensure a secure
connection, it takes the corresponding values in the SYN Received list
to the destination IP address of the packet in, and it checks the values
of the sequential number and the new acknowledgement value (see line
6). The next step is the most important one since to it will be checking
if the client is able to respond with an ACK message. Just like before,
the Controller will check if the ACK has received matching values in
the SYNACK Received list, in order to generate a legitimate IP address
list, called Friendly Hosts.
After it has been checked that it is a friendly client, two flow entries
will be set up in the flow table entries, in both directions. The matching
fields of these flow entries are:
• The transport protocol must be TCP.
• The port of the server must be 80 (web server).
• An idle timeout is set up to 60 seconds in order to free up memory
at the flow tables.
• In one flow entry, the source IP address must be the client IP
address and the IP destination address, that of the server. In the
other flow entry, it should be vice versa.
• The action to be accomplished in each flow entry is to forward the
packets through the OpenFLow Switch port of the destination IP
address.
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Once the flow entries are installed in the OpenFlow Switch, all the
traffic that matching the flow entries will not be sent to the Controller,
and the OpenFlow Switch will carry out the appropriate actions. If
no flow traffic matches with the flow entries in less than 60 seconds,
they will be deleted. If that happens, every time a source IP address
contained in the Friendly Hosts does not follow the steps indicated here
below, both flow entries will be directly set up again.
Moreover, sFlow is continuously controlling the amount of traffic flowing
to the server. A threshold is defined in order to warn the Controller that an
attack is being carried out. To do so, sFlow will send a message through a
JSON API informing about the attack. Once the attack has been detected,
Flag Attack variable changes to true and the algorithm will behave as follows:
B The limit has been exceeded and the Flag Attack has changed to true.
This means that the server is under attack. Once the server knows
that is under attack and has figured out which host has not carried
out the attack, the Attack Reaction mechanism is quite simple. The
condition state on line 16 checks whether the Flag Attack is true and
the packet in protocol is TCP. The following lines show two very simple
conditions. If the packet in source IP is contained in the Friendly Hosts,
both flow entries will be installed as it would be done in a normal sit-
uation. But if is not contained in it, all the packet in with IP server
destination will be dropped.
In the same way as sFLow warns the Controller about overcoming the
threshold, it will also inform it when flow traffic is again in a normal state,
under the limit. In this case, the Flag Attack variable changes to false and
the algorithm behaves as explained above.
5.2 Tools
5.2.1 Mininet
Mininet[17] is able to create, on a single native or virtual machine, realis-
tic virtual networks running in real kernels, switches and applications code.
Mininet allows developing and experimenting with OpenFlow and Software
Defined Networking systems. The creation and maintenance of the network
topology used in this experiment (see subsection 5.3.1) has been done through
Mininet.
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5.2.2 sFlow
sFLow[31] is used to monitor and manage traffic in complex networks. It can
be used in virtual networks but also in real ones. It has a JSON API [30],
which has been used in this project to inform the Controller of the network
situation.
5.3 Environment
Once the defense mechanism has been explained in detail, it is important to
carry out the necessary tests in order to study its behaviour. Consequently,
a virtual network topology has been implemented through Mininet with
the purpose of simulating a real environment. Such topology is explained in
detail in section 5.3.1.
In that topology some of the hosts will behave as attackers. Their mech-
anism is explained in section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Topology
Any system connected to the internet and providing TCP-based network
services, such as a Web server, FTP server, or mail server, is a real target for
TCP SYN Flooding attacks[32]. In this implementation, a Web Server
has been used as the victim of the attack.
Figure 5.1 shows a simple topology created through Mininet in a vir-
tual environment. This topology is initialised by executing the following
command line,
$ sudo mn –topo SINGLE,7 –mac –switch ovsk –controller remote
which means:
• –topo SINGLE,7 : Simple topology with seven hosts directly connected
to the OpenFlow Switch. One of them behaves as a web server respond-
ing to the host’s GET requests (once the TCP connection is correctly
done) with a simple .html document.
• –switch ovsk : One OpenFlow Switch.
• –controller remote: A remote POX Controller connected to the Open-
Flow Switch.
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Figure 5.1: Mininet topology
The red circles in the figure 5.1 represent the attacker, whose attack
mechanism is explained in the next section. The green ones are legitimate
clients requesting data to the server (blue circle) after the TCP connection
has been established.
5.3.2 Attack Behaviour
As section 4.1.1 explains, to carry out a SYN Flooding attack the attackers
have made sure that once they receive the SYN ACK message, they will not
respond with neither a ACK message nor a RST message, this forcing the
server to keep their information in a half-open connection state.
The selected attack to achieve this behaviour is a direct attack (see
4.1.1.1). Through a Python implementation, the developed attack software
aims at creating a different socket each time it is sent to the server.
It has created all the field values for both IP header and TCP header
which are then merged into one packet. In order to flood the server, the
attacker will send 200 SYN messages per second.
Chapter 6
Results
Regarding the main aspects of DoS attacks and their defense mechanism,
particularly TCP SYN Flooding attacks, they could be summarized as
follows: DoS and DDoS aim at crashing the system either by sending crafted
packets that exploit a software vulnerability or by sending massive vol-
umes of useless traffic to overwhelm the target. Protocols have some vulner-
abilities that are well known by the attackers, who try to exploit the system
by taking into account the expected behaviour of the protocols. In an SYN
Flooding situation, the attacker aims at making the server keep a half-open
connection in the server backlog, in order to deny service to legitimate
users.
This project presents a defense mechanism where legitimate users who
have carried out a secure connection, will be able to connect to the server,
even if there are attacks in process. To do so, the OpenFlow Controller will
generate a legitimate users list where the entries are data from each host
that accomplishes the TCP connection with the server.
Throughout this chapter an attack scenery will be shown as well as how
the network environment reacts to it. In order to study how TCP SYN Flood-
ing attacks react over the system and how the defense mechanisms responds,
the following information will be shown and discussed in this chapter.
Two different scenarios will be simulated. On the first one, there is no
defense mechanisms; instead, the Controller will forward all the packets it
receives to their destination (see section 6.1). On the second case, the defense
mechanism is set up at the Controller (see section 6.2). For both scenarios
and regarding figure 5.1, the behaviour of the hosts will be:
• Hosts 3, 4, 5, 6 are the legitimate users. Each one of them will con-
tinuously do a GET request to the server in different intervals of time.
Hosts 5 and 6 will request data each 125 and 130 seconds respectively,
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in order to show that even if the flow entry has been deleted from the
flow table (due to the idle time), the legitimate hosts will still be able
to accomplish the connection.
• Hosts 2 and 7 are the attackers. They will start the attack 135 seconds
after the test has started.
• Hosts 1 is the web server.
The next sections will show the amount of packets per second reaching
the server in both cases (with and without defense mechanism), as well as
the state of the server backlog, the data of the Friendly Hosts list and the
screenshots of a legitimate host terminal carrying out GET request to the
server (appendix B).
6.1 Attack without a defense mechanism
Figure 6.1 shows both the traffic generated to the server by legitimate hosts
(figure 6.2(a)) and the state of the connections in the server backlog (figure
6.2(b)) before the attack.
Both figures show a normal behaviour of a web server. The server receives
no more than 25 packets per second and the state of the connections is
TIME WAIT, which means that the server is connected to the hosts and it
is waiting for data requests. The backlog shows that hosts 3, 4, 5 and 6 have
achieved the connection.
135 seconds hosts later, 2 and 7 will start the attack. Each one of them
will send an average of 200 packets per second to the server, all of them SYN
messages. Once both hosts have started the attack, the server will receive
more than 500 SYN messages, changing their ports in each message. Such
situation is shown in figure 6.2(a).
The server has not any TCP SYN defense mechanism so it will crash
at some point as expected. As the figure shows 6.2(a), 470 seconds after
the attack has started, the server will stop receiving data from the hosts.
This means that the attackers have reached their scope, which is to fill the
backlog memory up in order to deny service to legitimate users. Figure
6.2(b) shows the connection states at the backlog where a large number
of state connections from hosts 2 and 7 in a SYN RECV state will show.
SYN RECV states means that the server has responded to the SYN message
received with a SYN ACK message and it is waiting for a response.
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In order to show the legitimate host behaviour before and after the attack
has been launched, figures B.1(a) and B.1(b) are attached in appendix ??.
Figure B.1(a) presents the normal behaviour of a host requesting data, but
in figure B.1(b) it can be seen that the legitimate host is not able to reach
the server.
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Figure 6.1: Normal traffic before the attack without a defense mechanism
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Figure 6.2: Attack scenary without a defense mechanism
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6.2 Attack with defense mechanism
Once it has been shown that the server has crashed under the attack in
absence of a defense mechanism, throughout this section we will study how
the Controller responds to the attacks.
Figure 6.3 shows the same situation as in the previous case: the way the
environment behaves in a normal situation where legitimate hosts request
data to the server. As the section above explains, the maximum amount
of packets per second reaching the server is almost 25 (figure 6.3(a)) and
the backlog connections state situation (figure 6.3(b)) is normal, without
half-open connection states.
The Controller, when there is not any attack, functions by keeping the
information of the legitimate hosts following the TCP three-way handshake
process. This process works with three lists as it is explained in 5.1 Here
below it has followed this process with host 3, showing the content of the
lists at each phase of the connection:
1. Host 3 sends a SYN message to host 1 (server). Host 3 sends
a SYN message to the server in order to carry out a TCP connection. In the
TCP fields it includes the sequential (seq = 1789773694 ) which is stored in
the SYN Received list with its IP address.
---------------------------------------------------------
TCP PACKET SYN 10.0.0.3 --> 10.0.0.1 :
seq = 1789773694 ; ack = 0
SYN RECEIVED { ’10.0.0.3 ’:
{’ack ’: 0, ’seq ’: 1789773694}}
SYN ACK RECEIVED {}
FRIENDLY HOSTS {}
---------------------------------------------------------
2. Server responds with a SYN ACK message to host 3 . The server
responds with a SYN ACK message the SYN message sent by the host. In
order to move the content of the SYN Received list to the SYNACK Received
list, the algorithm checks if the ack value (ack = 1789773695 ) is the sequen-
tial number of the SYN message plus one (seq = 1789773694 + 1 ). In this
list, it is include the IP address and the new ack number as well as the new
sequential value of the message. The state of the SYNACK Received list is
shown below:
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---------------------------------------------------------
TCP PACKET SYN and ACK 10.0.0.1 --> 10.0.0.3 :
seq = 3772125158 ; ack = 1789773695
SYN RECEIVED {}
SYN ACK RECEIVED { ’10.0.0.3 ’:
{’ack ’: 1789773695 , ’seq ’: 3772125158}}
FRIENDLY HOSTS {}
---------------------------------------------------------
3. Host 3 responds with an ACK message to the server. In the
third and last step of the three-way handshake TCP connection, once the
Controller receives the ACK message from the client (as a ACK SYN re-
sponse), it checks both sequential number and ack number to compare it with
the ones in the SYNACK Received list. In order to carry out the connection,
ack value of the ACK message (ack = 3772125159 ) must be the sequential
number of the SYNACK Received list plus one (seq = 3772125158). If these
fields do not match, the server will send a RST message to the client.
---------------------------------------------------------
TCP PACKET ACK : CONNECTION SUCCESFULL 10.0.0.3
seq = 1789773695 ; ack = 3772125159
SYN RECEIVED {}
SYN ACK RECEIVED {}
FRIENDLY HOSTS { ’10.0.0.3 ’: 3}
---------------------------------------------------------
Host 3 has managed to connect to the server and now is in the Friendly Hosts
list with the OpenFlow Switch port as the IP value. Seconds before, the at-
tacks started and once all the legitimate users have connected with the server,
the content of the Friendly Hosts list would be:
---------------------------------------------------------
SYN RECEIVED {}
SYN ACK RECEIVED {}
FRIENDLY HOSTS { ’10.0.0.5 ’: 5,
’10.0.0.4 ’: 4,
’10.0.0.6 ’: 6,
’10.0.0.3 ’: 3}
---------------------------------------------------------
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It is also important to remark that for all the host that have demonstrated
to be legitimate hosts, the flow entries have been installed in the OpenFlow
Switch in order not to send more packets to the Controller from those hosts.
Section B shows the flow tables installed in the OpenFlow Switch.
As in the example in section 6.1, hosts 2 and 7 start the attack 135
seconds after the test has begun. Figure 6.4 shows both the traffic flowing to
the server and the server’s backlog. When the rate of packets to the server
increases beyond the set threshold, sFlow sends an event to the Controller
which starts to drop packets from illegitimate hosts. This process takes less
than 5 seconds as it is shown in figure 6.4(a).
After the defense mechanism has been activated, legitimate hosts can still
send and receive information to and from the server. This is because of the
Friendly Host list. The state of the lists would be:
-----------------------------------------------------------
SYN RECEIVED {}
SYN ACK RECEIVED { ’10.0.0.7 ’:
{’ack ’:1, ’seq ’:2057411521} ,
’10.0.0.2 ’:
{’ack ’:1, ’seq ’:1159457829}}
FRIENDLY HOSTS { ’10.0.0.5 ’: 5,
’10.0.0.4 ’: 4,
’10.0.0.6 ’: 6,
’10.0.0.3 ’: 3}
-----------------------------------------------------------
While hosts 3, 4, 5 and 6 are in the Friendly Host list, hosts 2 and 7 are
in the SYNACK Received list because the Controller has not received any
ACK message after the server sent the SYN ACK message. Because of that,
these hosts are considered to be illegitimate and all the packets sent from
them will be dropped to prevent the server’s backlog from filling up.
Figure 6.4(b) shows the server’s backlog few seconds after the attack has
been blocked. There is not any anomaly, only a small set of packets in a
SYN RECV state, which do not interfere with the normal process of the
server.
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Figure 6.3: Normal traffic before the attack with a defense mechanism
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this chapter we will discuss opportunities for improvement in Section 7.1
and we will review the work done for the final project in Section 7.2.
7.1 Future work
In order to study how SDN technologies can help by defeating DoS and DDoS
attacks, throughout this project a defense mechanism for protocol attacks has
been presented and tested. Nonetheless, due to the complexity and extension
of the matter, some non tested improvements arise here:
• As section 2.1.2 shows, we have classified three different types of DoS
attacks depending on the target of the attackers. In this project only
one kind of protocol attack has been studied, in particular TCP SYN
Flooding attacks. By means of getting general conclusions about how
the OpenFlow standard can help by defeating these kind of attacks, a
particular survey for each DoS attack would be interesting.
• The software developed in the POX Controller environment aims at off-
setting the TCP handshake connection process vulnerabilities. Nonethe-
less, this application is meant specifically for this type of attack. Some
other protocol attacks exist and particular software for each of them is
needed in order to defeat them.
• There are four different phases when a DoS or DDoS attack is to be de-
feated. These phases are explained in section ??. A defense mechanism
might include all of them or only one, but the more of these phases a
defense mechanism has, the higher the level of security and complexity
it will have. In the proposed mechanism, there are two of these phases:
attack detection (based on anomaly detection) and attack reaction.
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In order to fully analize SDN features against DoS attacks, a defense
mechanisms including all the phases would be of interested.
• Even though Mininet creates virtual network topologies by helping to
test OpenFLow software, it has some limitations. Assigning desired re-
sources to the hosts, spoofing IP addresses and particular flow analysis
are some of them.
In order to carry out a comprehensive study, it would be interested to
use a real network topology with physical devices. For example, by
using specific PCs as the Controller and the web server.
7.2 Discussion
In this project we present a DoS defense mechanism working in SDN tech-
nology, by means of an OpenFlow Protocol. In order to study and test how
our work can help to prevent DoS and DDoS attacks, we have tested it in
a virtual environment with Mininet, and we have obtained data results and
graphics with the aid of sFlow.
Throughout this section, we will discuss the results obtained once the test
has been carried out. There is also a comparison between the advantages and
disadvantages of using either SDN technology or firewalls as DoS and DDoS
defense mechanisms.
With the purpose of studying the behaviour of SYN Floodig attacks on
devices that use TCP as their transport protocol and how to prevent them
from these attacks, we have done two different tests and the results are
presented in chapter 6.
The first one simulates a normal situation where there is no defense mech-
anisms, only a typical router which forwards the traffic to its destination.
After some time with trustful requests from different hosts, the attack mech-
anism is launched from two anywhere in the topology hosts. Since there is
no defense mechanism set up anywhere in the topology (SYN Cookies, SYN
Cache, Firewalls, Proxies, etc.), the results has been as expected. Once the
server is under attack, the state of the server backlog shows how it is filling
up with SYN RECV states; this means that the server is keeping the at-
tacker request connections in half-open connection states. These connections
remain in the backlog until a timeout is exceeded, then the server proceeds
to discard them. If the rate of received SYN ACK messages is too high, the
backlog will fill up with half-open connection states. As chapter ?? explains,
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when the backlog is full, the server starts to discard new request connections,
even the ones coming from legitimate hosts.
The aim of this project is to show how SDN technology can help us to
prevent this attacks. The second test presented uses the same topology and
attack mechanism that the previous one, but in this case a defense mechanism
is set up in a OpenFlow Switch. This defense mechanism has two phases, an
attack detection phase, based on anomaly detection, and a attack reaction
phase.
The attack detection phase uses two mechanisms in order to detect anoma-
lies in the environment. One of them checks the TCP flags field to avoid mal-
formed packets. The other one works with sFlow to inform the Controller
about high amounts of traffic arriving to the server. Both mechanisms work
correctly as explained in section 6.2, which shows how the server backlog is
not full of half-open connections and how the packets from the attackers are
dropped in the attack reaction phase.
Firewall technologies are also used to avoid these attacks, but as chap-
ter 3 shows, it is not the best option. There are two different types of firewalls:
application based firewalls and network-based firewalls. The defense mech-
anisms proposed might be compared with a network-based firewall due to
the OSI level where it is implemented. Section 4.1.2.2 explains two different
SYN Flooding defense mechanisms based on firewalls. In these cases, both
mechanisms aim at using spoofed packets to control the TCP connection
process.
The problem of network-based firewalls is that they are not able to access
to higher levels in the OSI model, and, as a result, it is not possible to
control some aspects like destination and source ports. This aspect is very
important in our implementation due to our Controller installing flow entries
with source and destination IP addresses from a server, specifying port 80.
We can conclude saying that separation of the control plane and the data
plane in SDN technology provides benefits for each part. With OpenFlow,
through Controllers based on high level programming languages it is possible
to orchestrate OpenFlow Switches by installing low-level rules on them. This
technology abstracts the developer to low-level programming languages too
close to the machine. Software developed with OpenFlow have more scala-
bility since there is just one device to control all the network. Since DDoS
attacks attack from a big number of different hosts, SDN allows us to control
the network topology as a whole.
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Appendix A
Protocol Headers Structure
Version
Header
Length
Type of Service
 (ToS)
Total Length
Identiﬁcation IPFlagsxDM
Fragment Oﬀset
Time to Live
 (TTL)
Protocol Header Checksum
Source IP Address
Destination IP Address
IP Option
Figure A.1: IP V.4 Header
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Source Port Destination Port
Sequence Number
Acknowledgement Number
Header
Length Reserved
TCP Flags
P Window Size
TCP Checksum Urgent Pointer
TCP Options
R S FU A
Figure A.2: TCP Header
OpenFlow Version Msg Type Packet Length
Transaction ID
Figure A.3: OpenFlow Protocol Header
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Appendix B
Result captions
B.1 Terminal Host
(a) Host behaviour before attack
(b) Host behaviour during attack
Figure B.1: Terminal Host without a Defense Mechanism
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(a) Host behaviour before attack
(b) Host behaviour during attack
Figure B.2: Terminal Host with a Defense Mechanism
B.2 OpenFlow Table
ninet@mininet -vm:~$ dpctl dump -flows tcp :127.0.0.1:6634
stats_reply (xid=0 x7fa25629 ): flags=none type =1( flow)
cookie=0, duration_sec =10s, duration_nsec =435000000s,
table_id=0, priority =32768 , n_packets =5, n_bytes =1788 ,
idle_timeout =60, hard_timeout =0,ip ,nw_src =10.0.0.1 ,
nw_dst =10.0.0.6 , actions=output :6
cookie=0, duration_sec =10s, duration_nsec =435000000s,
table_id=0, priority =32768 , n_packets =5, n_bytes =438,
idle_timeout =60, hard_timeout =0,ip ,nw_src =10.0.0.6 ,
nw_dst =10.0.0.1 , actions=output :1
cookie=0, duration_sec =31s, duration_nsec =528000000s,
table_id=0, priority =32768 , n_packets =11, n_bytes =834,
idle_timeout =60, hard_timeout =0,ip ,nw_src =10.0.0.5 ,
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nw_dst =10.0.0.1 , actions=output :1
cookie=0, duration_sec =192s, duration_nsec =359000000s,
table_id=0, priority =32768 , n_packets =79, n_bytes =15412 ,
idle_timeout =60, hard_timeout =0,ip ,nw_src =10.0.0.1 ,
nw_dst =10.0.0.4 , actions=output :4
cookie=0, duration_sec =192s, duration_nsec =991000000s,
table_id=0, priority =32768 , n_packets =456, n_bytes =34504 ,
idle_timeout =60, hard_timeout =0,ip ,nw_src =10.0.0.3 ,
nw_dst =10.0.0.1 , actions=output :1
cookie=0, duration_sec =192s, duration_nsec =396000000s,
table_id=0, priority =32768 , n_packets =77, n_bytes =5778 ,
idle_timeout =60, hard_timeout =0,ip ,nw_src =10.0.0.4 ,
nw_dst =10.0.0.1 , actions=output :1
cookie=0, duration_sec =31s, duration_nsec =526000000s,
table_id=0, priority =32768 , n_packets =12, n_bytes =2250 ,
idle_timeout =60, hard_timeout =0,ip ,nw_src =10.0.0.1 ,
nw_dst =10.0.0.5 , actions=output :5
cookie=0, duration_sec =192s, duration_nsec =954000000s,
table_id=0, priority =32768 , n_packets =452, n_bytes =86686 ,
idle_timeout =60, hard_timeout =0,ip ,nw_src =10.0.0.1 ,
nw_dst =10.0.0.3 , actions=output :3
